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In this essay Professor Deutsch examines the legitimacy ofju-
dicial review, in part as a response to recent works by three faculty
members of the Harvard Law School-John Hart Ely, Laurence
Tribe, and Frank Michelman. Because of the nature of the re-
sponse, this essay may also be read as a counterpoint to the articles
by Professors Mark Tushnet and Gary Leedespresented in this is-
sue. Professor Deutsch contends that questions of legitimacy are
endemic to processes ofpolitical choice, whether legislative orjudi-
cial Thus, criticisms or justfications ofjudicial review areflawed
to the extent they assume the burden of legitimacy to be differentfor
courts than for otherpolitical actors in a democracy. For Professor
Deutsch, the legitimacy of allpoliticalprocesses-that is, their abil-
ity to reach outcomes about which people may disagree without en-
dangering fundamental institutional values-turns instead on
whether those processes achieve what the polity acknowledges in
retrospect to have been acceptable goals, a judgment that wi/I itself
be shaped byprecedingpolitical choices. Institutionalfeatures such
as the traditions ofjudicial conference and opinion-and the special
role ofprecedent identfied by Professor Deutsch-help to ensure
the legitimacy ofjudicial choices in conflict with those of represent-
ative bodies. While changes in modern society may render the task
of understanding the precedential value of recent judicial opinions
uncertain, it is still the bond ofprecedent that fortifies the founda-
tions of judicial review.
The unknowable interplay between intention and action makes it
difficult to judge what is done by others. It is this fact that accounts for
the existence of rules such as hearsay and its exceptions, whose proper
application is mastered by only a handful of litigators. The question of
the significance of one's existence is rendered problematic by the same
disparity between what we intend and what we accomplish. Existen-
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tialists resolve this philosophical dilemma by arguing that only death,
which defines the temporal context of an individual life, permits one to
transmute the inventory of an individual's actions into the incontro-
vertible basis for statements about the meaning of an existence.
The legal institution known as the Supreme Court resists the solu-
tion of a definitive termination because it consists of nine separate indi-
viduals, each of whom serves for life. The work of the Court
constitutes a collective enterprise. Each of the Justices, however, when
writing for a majority, enunciates a precedent that binds the Court. It
is my contention that the disparity between an ongoing Court and nine
separate and limited lives constitutes the source of the political power
exercised by the Supreme Court and that adequate explications of its
opinions must necessarily take this disparity into account.
I.
By definition, there is no politics when there is agreement. In
politics, choices are made that bind those that dissent. Thus, both those
that exercise political power and those that are subject to it may be
forced to consider questions of legitimacy. In a recent Foreword to the
HarvardLaw Review's annual issue on the Supreme Court,' John Hart
Ely has written a devastating critique of one set of answers offered by
academics and judges to the question of what makes decisions of the
Supreme Court legitimate: that the Justices can and should protect our
fundamental social values. This is not the place to recapitulate the de-
tails of his critique, but especially recommended are his strictures
against those who say that judges should preserve tradition, identify an
underlying consensus, or anticipate future progress. Professor Ely
thinks it something less than self-evident either that yesterday's major-
ity (tradition) or tomorrow's majority (progress) should control today's,
and he is unable to understand at all what it means to say that today's
majority should control today's majority (consensus).
Let it be granted that political actors such as legislators and ad-
ministrators must make choices about matters of "fundamental val-
ues," and let it further be granted that judges are not under the
protective guidance of the Holy Spirit in accurately divining what those
matters might be. The question is whether there is then no legitimate
basis for the power of judicial review, whether it is always wrong for
judges in a democracy to refuse to enforce the choices arrived at by
1. Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword" On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92
HARV. L. REv. 5 (1978).
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other political actors. Professor Ely's way out is to have recourse to
footnote four of Carolene Products:2 judges can pass upon the legiti-
macy of theprocess by which fundamental values are chosen without
judging the values chosen by this process.' To use his words, Professor
Ely wants judges to restrict themselves to determining whether the
"majority. .. is systematically advantaging itself at the expense of one
or more minorities whose reciprocal support it does not need and
thereby effectively denying them the protection afforded other groups
by a representative system."4 This process-oriented review, argues Ely,
is conducted by judges, who, because they are not elected, do not have
a personal stake in any particular configuration of the political process.
As a result, this system of review in fact reinforces democracy, since
democracy works best when such configurations are constantly tested
and changed to remain compatible with the will of the majority.5
II.
The process Professor Ely designates as a representative system
can be defined as the political mechanism by which groups arrive at the
principles that constitute an acceptable consensus. To be accepted, a
principle-whether a judicial precedent, a legislative enactment, or an
administrative rule-must be sufficiently general and coherent to re-
present something the polity believes can be identified despite the
changes the future will bring. Any workable consensus, moreover,
must also meet the political requirement of being at least minimally
acceptable to the various groups and individuals involved. When this
consensus is unanimous, tradition and progress coalesce, thus vitiating
the problem of legitimacy. When agreement is something less than
unanimous, however, there will be arguments, and they may be formu-
lated in terms of legitimacy. Plaintiffs may argue that the status quo is
illegitimate because it violates fundamental rights; defendants may ar-
gue that recognition of rights in the circumstances presented represents
illegitimate change in the social status quo. And as new frontiers begin
to function as symbols of an irrecoverable past rather than as social
safety valves for the accommodation of dissatisfied individuals, it will
become increasingly likely that the recognition of rights will be per-
ceived as illegitimate governmental action.
2. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 nA (1937).
3. See Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforring Maode of JudicialReview, 37 MD. L. REv.
451 (1978).
4. Id. at 486-87.
5. Id. at 487.
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Revolution, in this context, can be defined as the point at which a
given political system has failed. Revolution, which signifies the loss of
legitimacy, occurs whenever enough individuals are sufficiently dissat-
isfied that the desire for replacement of choices embodied in the pre-
sent system outweighs concern over the potentially unsatisfactory
consequences of new choices. For individuals, revolutions involve
shifts in the criteria by which they identify themselves as political ac-
tors; a successful revolution demands a sufficient number of individual
shifts to produce a change in the political values held by the society.
Individual social and political identifications are, in the ordinary
course, matters governed by habit, by the experience of the past.
Revolution can thus be defined (in terms of the individual) as the re-
placement of habitual by spontaneous political behavior. Spontaneous
political behavior in this sense is perceived by the individual as a free
act, although it is, of course, capable of being rationalized. If the
revolution succeeds, however, meaning that a shift in social values has
occurred, new terms that define individuals as political beings have
come into existence, and the shifts in individual identifications can be
denominated rationalizations only if there is no such thing as a free act.
In retrospect, therefore, successful revolutions are perceived as
spontaneous acts rather than rationalizations of manipulations that
have succeeded in achieving undisclosed political ends. Given these
terms, the question Professor Ely fails to answer about changes in the
status quo wrought by the judiciary is whether they are distinguishable
from those attempted by other political actors, or whether one must
conclude that judicial decisions, like other political acts, will in the end
be judged legitimate only if they have successfully achieved what in
retrospect we acknowledge to have been their goals.
III.
The answer to that question lies in the fact that as members of an
appellate court become acquainted with each other's views, individual
rationalization becomes more and more difficult if any other member,
desiring to reach a different result, thinks it important to demonstrate
that the argument being advanced is actually a rationalization; the in-
stitutions of the judicial conference and opinion, in short, serve to max-
imize the likelihood that individual rationalizations will be exposed. If
we believe particular political decisions will be better to the extent that
their meaning is clearly apprehended by the actors making them, then
the searching dialogues forced upon judges by the institutions of the
judicial opinion and conference render judicial entities such as the
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Supreme Court more likely than other political bodies to arrive at
trustworthy choices. The dialogue that constitutes this process can be
seen as a current manifestation of the Socratic method revealed by
Plato in the Republic, a text basic to Western political philosophy. This
is not to say that judicial institutions always function effectively. It is,
however, the aspect of the Supreme Court's work embodied in these
dialogues, rather than Professor Ely's dichotomy between process and
substantive choices, that legitimates the imposition of the Court's polit-
ical choices upon the society at large.
It was through the image of Platonic Guardians that Learned
Hand argued that judicial review was illegitimate insofar as it permit-
ted political decisions to be overridden by those not subject to the elec-
toral process.6 The institution of judicial review, however, was not
without its defenders. A later Holmes Lecture by Herbert Wechsler7
stressed the contrast between the nature of political choice, which he
defined as essentially arbitrary, and legitimate judicial decisionmaking,
which he argued should be neutrally principled. Strikingly, however,
the only example cited of a principle meeting such standards was the
Court's abandonment during the New Deal of any attempt to limit con-
gressional control of the economy through use of the commerce and
8taxing powers.
A view of constitutional guarantees as limits on political power
informed Henry Hart's seminal article, "The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic."9
Unlike Wechsler, however, Hart, in defining the nature of the judicial
process, betrayed awareness of its common-law origins and thus argued
that in the last analysis it is the state courts that cannot be deprived of
the authority to render decisions in conflict with constitutional legis-
lative or executive action.' 0 What Hart failed to recognize was the
uniqueness of the American judiciary. Although the British judiciary
failed to gain independence from or equality with either the legislature
or the executive, several factors coalesced to make it possible for the
United States judiciary to become so fully a separate and equal branch.
The holding of Marbury v. Madison," whose precedential significance
is the announcement of that status, consisted of a judicial refusal to
accept a grant of power from the legislature, a holding difficult for the
6. L HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958).
7. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princ4vles of Constilutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
8. Id. at 23-24.
9. 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
10. Id. at 1401.
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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legislature to contest. Yet more important in the Supreme Court's as-
sumption of its role as constitutional arbiter are the series of decisions'2
on which Wechsler relied, in which the Court, while delineating the
meaning of the commerce clause, shifted political power over the econ-
omy from the states to Congress.
By definition, however, the process of allocating political power
differs from that of limiting it; it is this latter process that is the hall-
mark of judicial review, and the one that is called upon to meet the test
of legitimacy. In the end, therefore, a focus on the common law origins
of the judicial process avails as little as invocation of its principled na-
ture to establish effectively its claim to legitimacy when, as in the days
of the New Deal, the political choices made by judges differ from those
of other political actors.
IV.
The triumph of the legal process in the making of the United
States was the Supreme Court's use of the commerce clause to trans-
form diverse political entities into a single economic unit. The
Supreme Court failed when it attempted to use its power to nullify New
Deal economic legislation. In terms of process, judicial power was suc-
cessfully used to shape economic affairs when other national authori-
ties had not acted, but was not effectively utilized in opposition to those
bodies. A recent Supreme Court decision-NationalLeague of Cities v.
Usery' 3-in which the Court did nullify the action of a coordinate
branch of the national government, has been analyzed by two members
of the Harvard faculty' 4 in articles "overlapping in content and percep-
tion."' 5
Professor Michelman's article makes clear at the outset that the
nature of the substantive holding of law contained in the majority's
opinion could not be elucidated without focusing on the process of
decisionmaking:
It was the. . . powerful dissent. . . [that] first made me think
there must be even more to that case than meets the eye ...
The [dissenting] opinion speaks with a controlled intensity that at
12. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
13. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
14. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles." Permutations of "Soverelgnty" in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities:
The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv.
1065 (1977).
15. Michelman, supra note 14, at 1165 n.*; Tribe, supra note 14, at 1066 n.8.
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first seems disconsonant with both the immediate impact of the
Court's decision (denial of minimum-wage protection to state
and municipal employees) and its broader doctrinal significance
(recognition of some state governmental immunity from congres-
sional regulation under the commerce clause).16
Professor Tribe's article concludes that
in order to make sense of National League of Cities and the dis-
tinctions the Court insisted on drawing in the course of that deci-
sion, we must recognize in the Court s concern for federalism a
fear that, if state decisionmaking and the demands on state budg-
ets are not sufficiently respected, certain individual rights to de-
cent levels of basic government services, in such areas as public
health, sanitation, and fire and police protection, might not be
met.'
7
Expanding minimum-wage protection would not, however, have re-
quired the closing of sanitation, police, and fire departments, nor
would it have created a situation requiring those departments to pro-
vide services on a wholly arbitrary or discriminatory basis. Professor
Tribe's reading, moreover, ignores the serious implications of National
League of Cities in terms of the political power exercised by the Court.
V.
What makes National League of Cities a difficult decision is that,
since the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity applies only to gov-
ernmental agencies, its application requires formulation of a test capa-
ble of distinguishing public from private agencies engaged in the same
activity. The history of the state action doctrine is testimony to the
difficulties encountered in developing a workable set of criteria, and
the dissent demonstrates that the task is no easier when the doctrine
being applied is that of intergovernmental immunity. To refuse to
make the attempt, however, inevitably entails the surrender of judicial
power to adjudicate disputes based on the commerce clause, a result
clearly contemplated by the dissent:
It is unacceptable that the judicial process should be thought
superior to the political process in this area. Under the Constitu-
tion the Judiciary has no role to play beyond finding that Con-
gress has not made an unreasonable legislative judgment
respecting what is "commerce." My Brother BLACKMUN suggests
that controlling judicial supervision of the relationship between
the States and our National Government by use of a balancing
approach diminishes the ominous implications of today's deci-
16. Michelman, supra note 14, at 1165.
17. Tribe, supra note 14, at 1102.
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sion. Such an approach, however, is a thinly veiled rationaliza-
tion for judicial supervision of a policy judgment that our system
of government reserves to Congress.'1
It may well be that the Court has already surrendered its power to im-
plement the commerce clause when state authorities are sufficiently so-
phisticated to use fiscal measures in securing preferences for their own
citizens. Thus, in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 9 the Court upheld
a Maryland statute, under which Maryland businesses were afforded
preferential treatment, on the ground that
[t]he common thread [of commerce clause cases relied on to
invalidate the statute as an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce] is that the State interfered with the natural function-
ing of the interstate market either through prohibition or through
burdensome regulation. By contrast, Maryland has not sought to
prohibit. . . or to regulate. . . .Instead, it has entered into the
market itself to bid up [the] price."0
Nor is the possibility of a basic shift of power-one raised in
Hughes and resisted in NationalLeague of Cities-limited to the opera-
tions of the judicial branch. Our Constitution envisages a House of
Representatives capable of delaying (if not preventing) governmental
measures deemed important by the larger constituencies represented in
the Senate and the Presidency. As current difficulties in legislating an
adequate energy program demonstrate, the larger society pays a sub-
stantial price for institutions that protect the rights of constituencies
residing in relatively small territorial units. Indeed, the Court's success
in imposing on such smaller units at least the short-term economic
losses resulting from the commerce clause decisions is, in the end, at-
tributable to the political lesson taught by the Civil War of the overrid-
ing importance of obedience to national law as opposed to loyalty to
regional interests. Since this Nation functions as a single economic
unit, however, the fact of territoriality no longer adequately serves to
identify diverse economic and political interests. What originally justi-
fied the delays in the legislative process inevitably produced by the
composition of the House of Representatives was a diversity of territo-
rial interests; what produces those delays today is that many House
constituencies contain a disproportionate concentration of members of
a given national economic or political interest grouping. If National
League of Cities and Hughes are difficult decisions, in other words, it is
18. 426 U.S. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
20. Id. at 806.
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because of social changes resulting in a spread of economic sophistica-
tion that limits the effective exercise of all forms of political power.
VI.
Professor Tribe prefaces his analysis of National League of Cities
with a disclaimer: "I make no claims about what the Justices intended
or 'really had in mind.' I haven't a clue to what that might have been,
but I doubt that the conclusion of this Article was it."'" The reading of
a holding as not only unintended, but as something contrary to the in-
tent of the opinion's author, is a permissible one, since a later Court
might so construe the earlier holding, and the meaning of a precedent is
what is held by that later Court. What makes the interpretation im-
probable, however, is that the dissent by the author of the earlier opin-
ion (if he were still a member of the Court) would create a strikingly
painful situation for members of the Court who had joined the earlier
opinion.
Henry Hart's focus on law as an ongoing process obviates the need
to focus on a particular decision-to ask whether an opinion can really
mean what it says. It was precisely Wechsler's focus on this set of is-
sues, on the integrity of the process, that made his charge of inadequate
neutrality so unsettling an indictment of the decision in Brown v. Board
of Education.22 While a given doctrine is being developed, or insofar
as a later Court is engaged in adjusting the positions taken by its prede-
cessors, the legal process is operating to change existing patterns either
by restricting or expanding the precedents contained in earlier opin-
ions, but always while being forced to accommodate such precedents
by the institutional impediments to rationalization. It is only after the
passage of time, however, that retrospective reflection reveals a new
pattern, still ordered and coherent, but richer than its predecessors be-
cause the Court was forced to take those earlier decisions into account
in its development. Brown, however, was the product of a self-con-
scious process of litigation, and what such self-conscious campaigns
minimize is precisely the time between the day the Court first an-
nounces a position and the day it reaches the outermost limits of that
position. Assuming that Brown makes future campaigns of self-con-
scious litigation inevitable, the question presented is whether this situa-
tion inevitably changes the nature of the law made by decisions of the
Court. It is my contention that it does not, and that the increasing diffi-
21. Tribe, supra note 14, at 1066.
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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culty in delineating understandable patterns in the flow of decisions
means only that our society is forced to live with an awareness of the
essentially uncertain nature of the precedent contained in a judicial
opinion.
A judicial opinion purports to present an accurate history of what
it was that made the given judge resolve a described controversy in a
particular way. The insistence that that description be as definitive as
possible explains our society's refusal to accept oral opinions. The fact
remains, however, that the same controversy can be resolved in a dif-
ferent way without changing the history contained in the original opin-
ion, either by stressing more heavily an element that was considered
only in passing or by expanding the universe of the elements consid-
ered in arriving at the result. That the Court engages in this process is
what makes the law not only coherent but also applicable to new situa-
tions. How an individual Justice arrived at his decision, however, as
well as the significance of his service on the Court, will both remain
questions unanswerable until the end of that Justice's tenure creates a
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